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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The idea for this report was the seminar for civil society organizations organized by 
the IMF at the JVI in cooperation with the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
took place in Vienna at October 31 – November 2, 2007. Mr. Mico Apostolov 
attended the seminar as a CEA member and he has prepared a report upon which this 
report to USAID was prepared.  
 
The seminar was organized on the bases of the constant effort of IMF to introduce as 
much as possible transparency into its work with the wider sector of the civil society. 
The Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are in the core and in fact shape the civil 
society.  Thus, it is a perfect target group for transmission of the already achieved, the 
present engagements and the future projects and intentions of IMF.   
 
The quality of presented / learned was at the highest level, knowing that all of the 
presenters are key decision-makers and policy-creators for IMF and the region of 
Southeast Europe. Hence, the output was of importance, setting up the foundations of 
the current macroeconomic policies and giving indicators that are important 
milestones for national governments and CSOs in their day-to-day work. 
 
In a conclusion, it is evident that the overall macroeconomic parameters of the 
Southeast Europe show that this region is in phase of rapid convergence and the 
national economies will continue to grow rapidly, as expected, in the years to follow. 
Although second-generation (structural and institutional) reforms are underway in 
Southeastern European economies, the unprecedented levels and large variations of 
external imbalances occupy relatively high positions on the policymakers agenda. 
Widening external imbalances reflect either rapid capital formation or private 
consumption booms, but there are country-specific thresholds beyond which market 
participants are unwilling to finance these deficits.  
 
Even if the growth potential of these economies justifies the large and persistent 
deficits, in case of sudden shift in the market sentiment, the inevitable adjustment 
could have devastating macroeconomic implications. The ensuing reduction of current 
account deficits could lead to a slowdown in medium term growth and reduction of 
long run per capita income. Hence, despite the strengthened macroeconomic 
management, SEE economies must continue their cooperation with the Fund, 
particularly in terms of regular surveillance of macroeconomic and financial market 
developments. 
 
This report was prepared under the contract provisions signed between CEA and 
USAID for nonexclusive services to USAID as part of a grant agreement.  
 
This document will be published on the CEA web site 10 working days after 
submission to USAID (http://www.cea.org.mk). 
 
The report has been prepared by Mico Apostolov – CEA member, Marjan Nikolov 
President of CEA, and Aleksandar Stojkov Board Member of CEA.  
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 BACKGROUND 
 
IMF is an organization established 1945 and its mission is to keep the health of the 
world economy through a global institutional framework and to promote global 
economic growth and economic stability. It is an organization with a bit less than 
3000 employees from around 140 countries. 
 
On the bases of constant efforts to reach and further develop positive relationships 
with civil society organizations (CSOs), the IMF organized this seminar on 
macroeconomic policy. Thus, it was the goal of IMF to offer a framework of 
experience and expertise for these organizations i.e. to improve the understanding of 
macroeconomic policies that the countries introduce in close cooperation with the 
IMF.  
 
The usual critics to the IMF are that it is non democratic institution. Out of 183 
member countries, 159 countries1 are developing countries and only 24 (15%) are 
developed countries and in accordance with the quota system the developed countries 
have inproportionately higher voting power. 
 
Through this seminar the IMF gave the overall scope of its activity and focused 
closely on the aims of the IMF when supporting with CSOs. Firstly, an accent was 
given to public outreach, then to policy inputs i.e. the information generated form the 
nongovernmental sources. Therefore, it was important for IMF to aim at political 
viability, which is important to measure pro et contra IMF-supported policies. And 
finally, the last aim was to mobilize political support and national ownership of IMF-
supported adjustment programs.  
 
Furthermore, the course concentrated on the so-called ‘Government-IMF-CSO 
Triangle’. Hence, the transparency of IMF (as it is accountable to the member 
governments) is crucial in building the relationships and making them work. There 
are several steps needed to achieve such commitment: 
 
 Keep the initiative with government, whose responsibility it is to engage 
CSOs;  
 Handle links with CSOs in ways that do not alienate government; 
 If a government raises objections to IMF-CSO relations, explain the rationale 
in terms of the aims identified above; 
 Where a government is sensitive about IMF engagement with CSOs, a closer 
dialogue with the government and CSOs is needed. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE IMF AND ITS OPERATIONS 
Jenny Bisping,  
IMF External Relations Department 
 
The conference commenced with a presentation delivered by Ms. Jenny Bisping 
coming from the IMF External Relations Department, with the introduction of the 
IMF’s creation, mandate and structure. Consequently, a short outlook was given to the 
                                                 
1 2002 data.  
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IMF’s main activities, such as, surveillance, technical assistance, lending and 
assistance to low-income countries. The presenter gave more meaning to the so-called 
accountability and the possible ways of spreading it through transparency of the 
overall IMF structure and stuff. 
 
Some important figures about the IMF’s work were presented, but the most 
significant were the IMF lending positions in the world. The key features that 
determine the IMF’s landing are as fallows: 1. general, temporary - balance of 
payments supports; 2. access limits – depending on size of quota and crisis; 3. 
conditionality - safeguards of fund resources; 4. charges - rate of charge - market-
related.  
 
INSIDE THE IMF: DECISION MAKING AND TRANSPARENCY AT 
THE IMF  
Age F.P. Bakker,  
Executive Director for Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Georgia, Israel, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, Romania, and 
Ukraine  
 
It was an excellent occasion to have the Executive Director that represents Macedonia 
[with the other countries in the group of Netherlands] in the Board of IMF and to 
closely get to know the possible ways that shape the decision-making process within 
the core structure of the IMF. 
 
His presentation was comprised of few decisive points that explained the composition 
of the Board of Executive Directors of IMF, as well as, the main roles of the 
Execuitive Director while representing the group. In addition, he explained the quota 
based participation in the capital of the IMF, the voting powers and the ways to swing 
the decision-making process.  In fact, the quota is determined by a formula that shows 
the function of a country’s GDP, foreign reserves, trade openness, and export 
variability.   
 
However, Mr. Age F.P. Bakker underlined that at the present time the Fund considers 
introduction of new formula in order to increase the representation of fast growing 
economies, many of which are emerging market economies, and low-income 
countries. Thus, a needed consensus of this issue has to be achieved within the 
internal negotiation process of the Board.    
 
According to Mr. Age F.P. Bakker’s presentation the core mandate and operations of 
IMF and hence objectives are:  
1. To promote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and 
orderly exchange arrangements; 
2. Foster economic growth and high levels of employment;  
3. Provide temporary financial assistance to countries to help ease balance of 
payments adjustment.  
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Nonetheless, the IMF through all these years of existence has managed to preserve 
these objectives, cunningly adopting itself to the newly aroused satiations, solutions 
and problems. 
 
Quota system
0,04%
29,89%
17,19%
6,20%
46,68%
Macedonia EU 15 US Japan Other countries
 
Figure 1. IMF quota system 
 
CEA comment: The IMF is not transparent in choosing its President and there is no 
procedure for that as well.  
 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR EMERGING EUROPE: DELIVERING 
THE PROMISE OF CONVERGENCE  
Luc Everaert 
Division Chief, Regional Studies Division 
European Department, IMF 
 
According to the findings of Mr. Luc Everaert the growth of Southeastern Europe has 
been rapid, reflecting real convergence with the Western advanced economies. The 
inflation has been put under control. However, the most important challenge is the 
continuity of this high growth and convergence, as well as, creating new jobs and 
benefits.  
 
The biggest concerns fell on the external account imbalances with high external debt 
which are unsustainable. Yet, the region’s outlook remains favorable.    
 
The following chart shows some essential parameters, with prediction for the years 
2007 and 2008:  
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Real GDP growth CPI inflation
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Europe 3.8 3.6 3.1 3.5 3.3 3.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5
Advanced European economies 2.9 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 -1.2 -0.8 -0.8
Emerging European economies 6.6 6.3 5.7 7.2 6.8 6.0 0.1 -1.9 -2.9 2.0 1.2 0.6
    Albania 5.0 6.0 6.0 2.4 2.5 3.3 -5.9 -7.4 -6.5 -3.2 -3.9 -3.9
    Bosnia & Herzegovina 6.0 5.8 6.5 7.5 2.5 1.9 -11.5 -15.3 -15.0 3.0 -0.5 -0.9
    Bulgaria 6.1 6.0 5.9 7.3 8.2 7.9 -15.8 -20.3 -19.0 3.5 3.0 2.5
    Croatia 4.8 5.6 4.7 3.2 2.3 2.8 -7.8 -8.4 -8.8 -3.0 -2.6 -2.3
    Macedonia, FYR 3.0 5.0 5.0 3.2 2.0 3.0 -0.4 -2.8 -5.9 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5
    Romania 7.7 6.3 6.0 6.6 4.3 4.8 -10.3 -13.8 -13.2 -1.7 -2.8 -2.1
    Serbia 5.4 5.0 5.5 12.7 4.7 6.1 -12.3 -9.9 -8.9 -1.5 2.9 3.0
    Slovenia 5.7 5.4 3.8 2.5 3.2 3.1 -2.5 -3.4 -3.1 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook .
SEE Selected economic indicators, 2006-08
Current Account 
Balance/GDP
General Government 
Balance/GDP
 
 
 
In contrast to the world and European economic growth which is expected to weaken, 
the growth of the SEE region will likely further ahead.  Thus, the policymakers will 
need to ensure continued convergence through some useful mechanisms2:   
1. Tighten monetary and fiscal policies to deal with excess demand and 
provide safety margins for vulnerabilities; 
2. Implement very strong banking supervision and further reforms to 
strengthen the financial system; 
3. Broaden structural reforms to improve investment climate, flexibility 
of markets, and reap benefits from international economic integration. 
 
According to this presentation it was evident that a strong banking sector will 
crucially attribute to stability against turbulence.  
 
MACEDONIA AND THE IMF 
Bert van Selm, IMF Resident Representative in Macedonia 
 
The resident representative of IMF to Macedonia expressed his views on the overall 
macroeconomic situation and gave some pointers towards future developments.   
 
Mr. Bert van Selm gave solid information on the macroeconomic stability of the 
country explaining that the inflation is low, the exchange rate is stable, the interest 
rates are decreasing and the current account deficit is decreasing. He was positive on 
the fact that Macedonia has managed to reduce the external debt [examples: London 
Club buy-back, Jan 2006 (US$163 million); Paris Club buy-back, Jan 2007 (US$104 
million) and IMF repayment, May 23, 2007 (US$44 million)] and managed to further 
increase the reserves.  
 
                                                 
2 Source: Mr. Luc Everaert’s presentation 
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However, he made a clear case that the growth still remains sluggish3, or al least that 
something is happening or to happen. 
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Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook. 1/ SEE refers to: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Romania. CEEC-5: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. 
Baltics: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. CIS-4: Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine. 
 
 
Also, one of the most negative factors that disturb the overall positive picture of the 
Macedonian economy is the fact that at “35%, the unemployment remains very 
high”4:  
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3 Mr. Bert van Selm’s presentation 
4 Mr. Bert van Selm’s presentation and discussion with the participants  
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Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
 
Macedonia introduced Tax reform in 2006 introducing flat PIT rate of 12% and as of 
the beginning of the fallowing year it should be lowered to 10%. In addition, there is 0 
taxation on re-inverted profits, but on the other hand VAT remains on the previous 
level. 
  
The resident representative of IMF to Macedonia estimated that there are positive 
overall developments due to the newly introduced strategy “Invest in Macedonia”, but 
at the same time specific characteristics of the campaign were questioned.  
 
Here are some of the indicators presented by Mr. Bert van Selm, IMF Resident 
Representative in Macedonia:  
 
I. 2007 budget 
• Slight increase in the deficit to 1 percent of GDP 
• Used to finance a number of important reforms: harmonized social security 
bases, higher investment, lower tariffs, lower income taxes 
• Budget remains in surplus in year to date  
• For 2008 government targets deficit in the 1 to 1½ percent range 
 
II. Macro-economy looks OK—but markets do not 
 
III. Strengthening the financial sector 
 
• Credit to the private sector increased rapidly in 2006 (at 30 percent) but credit 
to GDP remains modest (at around 30 percent) 
• Spread between lending and deposit rates remain high (at around 6 percentage 
points) 
• New banking law strengthens the powers of the supervisor  
• Need for more effective competition and foreign expertise 
• New banking law allows for foreign bank branching  
 
IV. Improving the labor market 
FYR Macedonia: Unemployment and Employment 
Rates
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Unemployment rate
Employment rate
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• Tax wedge is 67.2 percent of net wages, compared to OECD average of 57 
percent (FAD calculations)    
• Improving tax administration to reduce compliance costs: creation of 
harmonized basis for social security contributions and PIT, in two stages  
• Minimum contributions discriminate against low-wage sectors 
• Health care contributions discriminate against part-time labor 
 
V. Imperfect product markets : 
• Telecommunications 
• Air Transportation 
• Energy 
 
IMF’S VIEW OF GOVERNMENT POLICY 
 
• Consensus view: higher growth by maintaining macro-stability while 
making markets work better 
• Many of the ‘100 steps’ go in the right direction: more competition, 
market liberalization, clearer property rights... 
• …but in the view of the IMF, a level playing field needs to be 
maintained, and safeguards are needed to protect government revenue, 
Macedonian depositors, etc. 
• examples: Banking Law, Free Economic Zones Law, Energy Law.   
 
  
 
THE BALKANS: TURNING THE CORNER 
Promoting Investment and Growth through Structural Reforms 
Vladimir Gligorov, Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies 
 
The presentation of Mr. Vladimir Gligorov mainly focused on three topics. The first 
one was on growth and a present / possible imbalance, the second was on regional 
trade liberalization and the third was on the existing political risks.  
 
The growth of the economies in Southeast Europe is estimated to be positive and will 
continue to grow as influx of FDI is expected to renew the existing industrial 
capacities and to create new production sights.  
 
Imbalances: reality or myth? It is estimated that the inflation should not be a problem, 
but as an exception of this argument is stated Serbia [when it comes to wage 
inflation]. Indeed, the current account deficits are sustainable because of the 
continuous growth of exports, increase in remittances and increased saving. Even 
though the balances seem to be sustainable, the foreign debt development may present 
problems due to mostly fixed exchange rate regimes and thus it is not clear what the 
level of debt tolerance for these countries really is.  
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The imbalances on the labour markets are indeed pronounced, but what strikes the 
most is that the job creation in the private sector is still very limited {Macedonia and 
Serbia are obvious examples].       
 
The overall growth perspectives of the Southeast Europe remain positive and should 
accelerate on medium and long run over the crucial 5% benchmark as a regional 
average. In addition, the investments should take over the consumption, and exports 
should continue to grow by double digits. 
 
It is clear that further structural reforms need to be reinforced in each country 
separately restructuring the economy, introducing more competition and adjusting the 
labour markets. Hence, this will give serious impetus to increasing SEE export shares 
and will enable shifting from low to medium skills industry exports. 
The competitive advantage of SEE is still based on products that contain low-added 
value even though the development in recent years tend to show that there is 
specialization more in medium-skills-white-collar and even in high-skills industry 
exports.  
 
Mr. Vladimir Gligorov gave the fallowing conclusions: 
 
Tentative Conclusions 
• Recent development of export shares and RCA’s suggest a general skills 
upgrading in SEE export industries; 
• Stronger SEE regional diversification in trade specialization and labour skills 
might hint at first structural effects of the regional Free Trade Agreements in 
recent years. 
 
 
THE RECENT SPATE OF FLAT TAXES IN EASTERN EUROPE  
Alexander Klemm, Economist, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF  
 
In this course was presented the overall development of the ‘flat tax revolution’. It 
was quite interesting to hear the analyses of the IMF for a phenomenon that is still 
shaping. The early examples of introduction of the flat tax (in the text further on 
marked as FT) have received little attention. However, the second wave was initiated 
by the outstanding economic performance of the Baltic countries while introducing 
flat taxes.  Then, there are the newest examples of Macedonia and Mongolia in 2006, 
and the latest discussion i.e. thinking of introducing FT in countries like Bulgaria, 
Germany, Greece, Mexico, Slovenia, etc. 
  
 12
 
 
 
 
Y ea r /1
be fo re a fte r b e fo re  a fte r
E s ton ia 19 94 1 6 -3 3 2 6 18 4 .7 27 7 .1 -0 .4
L ith uan ia 19 94 1 0 -3 3 3 3 10 5 .7 34 7 .2 0 .4
La tv ia 19 97 1 0 -2 5 2 5 46 4 .8 43 3 .9 0 .2
R uss ia 20 01 1 2 -3 0 1 3 10 8 .6 16 4 .5 0 .5
S lovak ia 20 04 1 0 -3 8 1 9 12 03 .8 2 505 .9 -0 .7
U k ra in e 20 04 1 0 -4 0 1 3 3 8 .4 13 8 .7 /2 -1 .3
G e org ia 20 05 1 2 -2 0 1 2 5 9 .6 0 .0 -0 .2
R om an ia 20 05 1 8 -4 0 1 6 82 3 .7 1 029 .6 -0 .7
Ice lan d 20 07 36 .7 2 -3 8 .72 35 .7 3 . . .
K a zak hs ta n 20 07 5 -20 1 0 . . .
K ygyzs ta n 20 07 1 0 -2 0 1 0 . . .
M aced on ia 20 07 1 5 -2 4 1 2 . . .
M on go lia 20 07 1 0 -3 0 1 0 . . .
M on te neg ro 20 07 1 6 -2 4 1 5 . . .
S o u rces : K ee n  e t a l. (2 006 ), IM F  cou n try rep o rts , E IU .
N o tes : 
2 / O n ly in d iv idu a ls  ea rn ing  u p  to  1 .4  tim es  the  subs is tence  le ve l a fte r the  re fo rm  a re  en title d .
1 / V a lu e  pe r a nnu m , ign o rin g  any fam ily e le m e n t. P re - an d  pos t-re fo rm  a llow an ce  co nve rted  a t the  ra te  
o f the  re fo rm  ye a r to  abs trac t from  cu rre ncy f luc tua tio ns .
T ax  ra tes  (% )
T ab le  1 : R e ce n t F la t T ax  R e fo rm s
C han ge  in  re venu e  to  
G D P  ra tio  (p .p .)
A llow an ce s  (U S $)
 
 
The different waves of tax reform in the counties differ in many ways. Mainly the 
differences are because of the particular nature of the country in question, as well as, 
the timing of FT introduction and targets that are intended to be achieved. 
 
Though, there are also similarities. There is almost always increase in basic 
allowances and many of the second wave countries have involved cut in social 
contributions. The introduction of FT was closely tied to administration reforms. 
Another similarity is that the capital income often was taxed at reduced flat rates.  
 
The effects of introducing FT are on work incentives, equality, simplicity and 
automatic stabilization. When it comes to practical evidence it is a broad consensus in 
the literature that the effects of tax changes remain modest.   
 
Here are the conclusions of this particular course: 
 
• Rhetoric increasingly based on evidence—but still need more! 
• Diversity of FTs and accompanying reforms preclude simple generalizations  
• Interaction with social security often ignored 
• No presumption that movement to FT is associated with reduction of the 
progressive system 
• Impact of FTs on work incentives is not clear-cut 
• Simplification, but important only if no threshold 
• FT as signal to rest of the world 
• Opportunity to clean-out and widen base may be a key (political economy) 
benefit 
• Sustainability of the FT remains unclear (political economy considerations 
point to schedules that tend to benefit middle income earners) 
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CASE STUDY BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
Graham Slack, IMF Resident Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The study on Bosnia and Herzegovina presented the current challenges that this 
country faces. The presentation included the basic data on the economic record. as 
well as, the current and possible economic outlook. 
 
First, the economic record was based on indicators such as: growth, investments, 
external position, financial sector and fiscal policy. 
 
Second, the indicators on the economic outlook showed that the public finances need 
to be put under control. Thus, strengthen financial stability and improve business 
environment. Indeed, the GDP growth is and will probably remain strong. On the 
other hand, the current account will widen, unemployment is ought to remain high, 
and is expected possible sharp deterioration in government balance.  All in all, the 
economic situation will improve.  
 
MACEDONIAN EXPERIENCE WITH THE IMF 
CEA comments  
 
Without further elaboration we present the CEA view on the results from the 15 years 
of IMF – Macedonia cooperation. Since its independence and membership renewal, 
Macedonia has undergone 124 months (or roughly 10 years) in formal arrangements 
with the Fund. Initial stabilization programs (the Structural Transformation Facility 
and the Stand-by Arrangement) in the mid 1990s have been sucessfully completed 
and resulted in rather stable macroeconomic environment. Unfortunately, the 
subsequent adjustment programs (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility and the 
Poverty Reduction Growth Facility) have had mixed record.  
 
There are a number of reasons on both sides for the insufficient progress in the 
implementation of second-generation reforms:  
 
(i) the Fund has insisted on very detailed matrices of measures and 
performance indicators which sometimes were not crucial for the 
success of the program; 
(ii) lack of national ownership of the IMF-supported programs, as seen by 
the weak commitment and implementation capacity by the Macedonian 
authorities 
(iii) very weak institutional capacity for preparation of macroeconomic 
adjustment programs and insufficient political support for the painful, 
but needed reforms (treatment of the Fund as alibi for the 
implementation of politically unpopular reforms). 
 
There are indications that during election years the establishment in Macedonia was 
not really keeping to the agreed with the IMF arrangements. Election-driven expenses 
have frequently led to serious incompliance with the structural benchmarks and 
performance criteria, undermining the Fund's confidence in the Government 
commitment. Unfortunately, this has led to much harsher measures in the post-
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election periods. Such stop-and-go policies have resulted into sluggish economic 
growth and undermined credibility. 
 
Achievements: 
 
 Macroeconomic and financial stabilization  
 Medium-term current account sustainability 
 Knowledge transfer and institutional capacity building 
 Fiscal and public debt sustainability 
 Substantial mobilization of donor support 
 Improved fiscal transparency 
 
Failures:  
 
 Continuation of the soft budget constraints (SBC) practices 
 Severe fiscal swings and insufficient financial consolidation of the extra-
budgetary funds (particularly, the Health Insurance Fund) 
 Lack of ownership of reform agenda  
 Imported IMF credibility for “Domestic Government programs”.  
 Moral hazard of having IMF programs 
 
Table: Main characteristic of IMF programs within Macedonia (yellow highlight 
shows parliamentary election year).  
  IMF 
Stabilization 
component 
Adjustment 
component GDP 
SDR 
from 
IMF 
in mln 
$ USD 
(241) 
Parliamentary 
Elections 
Budget 
deficit 
1994 STF 
IMF 
supported 
inflation 
fight success 
after the 
government 
failed to 
succeed in 
their 
program   -1,8 40 1 -2,9
1995 SBA 
Gross 
foreign 
reserves 
Loss making 
companies 
(25) -1,1 35   -1,2
1996 SBA     1,2     -0,5
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1997 ESAF   
Treasury, 
VAT, deficit 
instead of 
surplus in the 
budget, 
flexibility of 
the labor 
market, 
program not 
fulfilled 1,4 75   -0,4
1998 ESAF   
Treasury, 
VAT, deficit 
instead of 
surplus in the 
budget, 
flexibility of 
the labor 
market, 
program not 
fulfilled 3,4   1 -1,7
1999 CCFF Kosovo   4,3 19   0
2000 PRGF13/EFF30   
The tax 
burden relief 
on the direct 
taxes, public 
administration 
reform 4,5     2,5
2001       -4,5 44   -6,3
2002 SMP   
TAT moral 
hazard, 
program not 
fulfilled 0,9   1 -5,6
2003 SBA   
Flexibility of 
labor market 3,4 28   -1,7
2004 SBA     2,5     -0,9
2005 
Three-year 
SBA     4,1*      3,8*
2006 
Three-year 
SBA   4,0*  1 3,2*
2007 
Three-year 
SBA   5,5*    
*Estimate. 
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